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1 Introduction
Industry standards are set at di¤erent stages of a products development 
the technologys development stage, the approval or committee phase, and
the commercialization phase. Firms collaborate to jointly develop compat-
ible products (Katz and Shapiro, 1998), rms and standard-setting bodies
negotiate standards in committees (Chiao, Lerner and Tirole, 2005), and
consumers choose de-facto industry standards in the marketplace (Ohashi,
2003, Park, 2004, Gandal, Greenstein and Salant, 1999). When deciding
whether to standardize or not, rms face a tradeo¤: In industries with net-
work e¤ects, technological compatibility improves the chances for consumer
acceptance, but it also means having to share the resulting prots with other
sponsors of the standard. As a result, rms have frequently chosen to intro-
duce competing technologies into the market, sometimes with the outcome
that neither of the technologies is adopted by end consumers (Kretschmer,
2005). For example, the failure to converge on a common standard is of-
ten put forward as the main reason for the failure of quadraphonic sound
(Postrel, 1990).
The Compact Disc (CD) is an example of a particularly successful con-
sumer electronics technology. The Compact Disc was developed in collabo-
ration by Philips and Sony (P/S for the remainder of the paper) in the late
1970s and early 1980s in response to technological developments in related
elds and an increasing sense that vinyl records and magnetic tape had
reached their limits in terms of audio performance and user-friendliness.
There were several competitors to P/Sdevelopment, most notably by JVC
and its mother company Matsushita. The Japanese Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) scheduled a standard-setting conference
in Spring 1981, but the decision taken at the conference (P/Stechnology
was approved and commercialized, while JVCs technology was approved,
but never manufactured for end consumers) was a foregone conclusion be-
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cause P/S had preannounced the technical features of their technology and
JVC/Matsushita subsequently announced their support of the P/S standard.
In the consumer electronics market which had seen its fair share of standards
battles fought out in the market, this was a remarkable episode; choosing a
standard prior to launching the technology in the market avoided a VHS-
Betamax-style standards battle, and the process of choosing a standard ap-
peared relatively quick and painless.1 While other authors have focused
on post-launch developments in the CD industry, such as post-introduction
capacity investments (McGahan, 1993), the existence of indirect network
e¤ects (Gandal, Kende, Rob, 2000) and the comparison with similar, but
unsuccessful, technologies (Rohlfs, 2001), we focus on the process by which
erce rivals in the marketplace, Sony, Philips and JVC, were able to agree on
a common technological standard before introducing a new audio technology.
Viewed historically, the introduction of the CD seems straightforward. In
the process itself however, a number of issues were not obvious. For example,
why did P/S publish the Redbook before the DAD conference, committing
prematurely to a technology? Similarly, why did JVC/Matsushita announce
its intentions to support P/Sstandard before the DAD conference instead
of simply waiting for the outcome of the conferences approval process and
continuing development of their technology?
Building a simple, yet comprehensive model of standard-setting with
technological progress, we study the tradeo¤s emerging prior to launching a
technology and identify the tradeo¤s between standardization benets, pre-
emption motives, and technological progress. We show that even in these
pre-market stages, the timing of decisions is important and that rms have
to weigh up the cooperative and competitive elements of pre-market choices.
This captures the intuition of a range of cases (including the Compact Disc
1The process from starting intensive development on digital audio technology to setting
a CD standard took less than three years. By comparison, the average time for agreement
on an IEEE standard is seven years (Spring et al., 1995).
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launch) in which competitive and cooperative motives exist simultaneously.
We identify a set of parameter values for which standardization on a tech-
nological standard is possible, as in the case of the CD, but also identify
situations in which standardization is less likely. We are especially inter-
ested in studying the incentives for a prelaunch of a technology even before
its full technological potential is reached. A prelaunch limits a rm to a
certain set of product characteristics and thus curtails further technological
development, but at the same time it may persuade rivals to join the pro-
posed standard. Due to its comprehensive formulation, our model allows
us to classify emerging technologies into ones where standards battles are
likely or where a product standard is likely to emerge prior to the prod-
uct launch. If agreement on a joint standard prior to commercialization is
reached, we are further able to identify conditions under which a prelaunch
takes place relatively early, implying foregone technological progress, and
conditions for which a later prelaunch is feasible, making full use of the
technologys potential. Which result emerges depends on the interaction
between the playersrelative strengths, the strength of network e¤ects, the
degree of substitutability among technologies, and each products own brand
loyalty.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briey discuss
related literature. We then introduce the basic model in Section 3 and
illustrate our central results with an analysis of the CD launch and some
numerical simulations in Section 4.2 We then discuss the results of our
model in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude and point out directions for
future research.
2For a more detailed account of the case see e.g. Gamharter and Kretschmer, 2004.
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2 Related literature
Various aspects of pre- and post-market standardization processes have been
studied in some detail.3 For our study, the literature on the emergence of
hybrid (pre-market) standardization, which includes both market-based and
committee-based elements, is of particular relevance.4 Farrell and Saloner
(1988) show that hybrid standardization processes may be superior to pure
(market- or committee-based) mechanisms because rms have two oppor-
tunities for coordination in each period: the market and the committee.
Coordination is therefore achieved more frequently than with the market
mechanism alone, and faster than by solely using the committee mechanism.
The broader literature on network e¤ects and standardization is vast and
will not be reviewed in detail.5 Related to our study, Sheremata (2004) nds
that radical and incompatible innovation can be more protable than incre-
mental and compatible innovation. High switching costs for consumers favor
radical innovation because a greater improvement is needed to compensate
for foregone network benets. We focus explicitly on the role of techno-
logical quality in shaping rival rmsdecisions to choose (in-)compatibility.
Further, we consider a situation where there is no clearly dened incumbent
3From a theoretical perspective, see e.g. Kindleberger, 1983; David and Greenstein,
1990; Besen and Farrell, 1994; Axelrod et al., 1995. Empirical studies on the e¤ect of
standardization on market success include Weiss and Sirbu, 1990; Funk and Methe, 2001;
and Dranove and Gandal, 2003.
4See, for example, Farrell and Saloner, 1988; David and Monroe, 1994; Funk and Methe,
2001; and Funk, 2002.
5For a management/marketing perspective see e.g. Hill, 1997; Schilling, 2002; Frels,
Shervani and Srivastava, 2003; Shankar and Bayus, 2003; for an economics perspective
see e.g. Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986, 1994; David and
Greenstein, 1990; Besen and Farrell, 1994; Koski and Kretschmer, 2004.
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competing for the new technological generation.6
In addition to the standardization literature our analysis draws on other
strands of research in management strategy and industrial organization.
First, we relate to research that explores properties of oligopolistic compe-
tition dependent on some prior stage of competition, e.g. R&D. Typically,
rms make decisions on R&D investments in the rst stage and compete in
the product market in the second stage (DAspremont and Jacquemin, 1988;
Amir, Amir and Jin, 2000; Suetens, 2005). The structure of our model is sim-
ilar, with three major extensions: rst, we focus on timing rather than e¤ort
or intensity decisions such as R&D expenditure in the rst stage. Second, we
allow for preannouncement in the rst stage. Third, we model an industry
with network e¤ects in the market stage. Hence, technology development
in our model needs to address issues of (in-)compatibility, standard-setting,
and its consequences for the market stage.
Also related to our work are studies of timing such as preemption games
(e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985; Levin and Peck, 2003) or war-of-attrition
games (Bulow and Klemperer, 1999, Hoerner and Sahuguet, 2004). Innova-
tion and technology adoption are often modeled as timing games (Hoppe,
2002; Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2005). Two key ndings of this literature
are that rst-mover advantages may speed up adoption through preemption
motives,7 and that late-mover advantages may exist because technologies im-
prove over time (Hoppe, 2002). We model this tradeo¤ (for an illustration
see Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2001) in the context of standard-setting in
network e¤ect industries. Further, we extend the action space of the players
by allowing for a technological prelaunch.
Our study also relates to the literature on preannouncements. Nagard-
6Previous research suggests that new technologies competing against a powerful in-
cumbent may su¤er from a lack of standardization in the new technology - as was the case
in quadraphonic sound (Postrel, 1990, Kretschmer, 2005).
7This may even erode all potential rst-mover advantages (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985).
6
Assayag and Manceau (2001) analyze the rationale for preannouncements in
the context of indirect network e¤ects based on data from French CD audio
market in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, and nd that consumersprior-
to-launch expectations positively a¤ect the technologys penetration rate.
Software producersexpectations have only an indirect inuence that largely
depends on the level of consumer expectations. Lee and OConnor (2003)
develop a framework for new product launch strategies for network products
in which product preannouncements fulll three primary roles: preemption,
alliance seeking and encouragement of complementary goods producers and
consumer expectationsmanagement. In a study of the at panel display
industry, Spencer (2003) nds that sharing technological knowledge with
competitors may increase rms innovation performance by enabling it to
shape the institutional environment in favor of its own technology. We for-
malize and extend this literature by (i) simultaneously capturing preemptive
and collaborative motivations, and by (ii) analyzing product prelaunch as
a particular knowledge sharing strategy in a network e¤ect environment.
Dranove and Gandal (2003) study the impact of product preannoucements
on standard establishment in the digital video market. They nd that pre-
announcement of the DIVX technology briey slowed down adoption of the
DVD. Unlike their study, we focus on preannouncement e¤ects prior to prod-
uct introduction. Our work also relates to models of (strategic) information
disclosure (Gill, 2004; Gordon, 2004; Jansen, 2005a, 2005b), which empha-
size the interaction between the incentives to disclose (usually from sending
a strength-signal to rivals) and associated disincentives (usually from tech-
nological and knowledge spill-overs). Unlike our model, this literature tends
to focus on knowledge spillovers of R&D among competitors rather than
issues of (in-)compatibility resulting from strategic preannouncements.
Our model combines insights from these streams of research and is to
our knowledge the rst that explicitly links a timing game (capturing com-
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petitive technological development for a new standard) with a subsequent
Cournot-type market stage in a network e¤ect industry. In solving the
model, we obtain interesting results on our motivating case, the Compact
Disc, but also on preannouncement timing and standardization decisions
more generally. Hence, we also address previous calls for research on stan-
dardization to consider the dynamic aspects of standard adoption and coali-
tion formation (Katz and Shapiro, 1994; Axelrod et al., 1995).
3 The Model Setup
Consider a game with two players, 1 and 2, and two stages, a development
stage and a subsequent market stage. In the development phase, the qualities
of the two competing technologies and their compatibility are determined
through the timing decisions of players in the rst stage when to prelaunch
or concede (if at all), or staying in. After the qualities of the technologies
(and their possible compatibility) have been determined, rms compete in
quantities in the (Cournot) market stage.
3.1 Development Stage
Both playerstechnologies develop exogenously over time.8 Time runs from
0 to T . Players are allowed to move (simultaneously) at N discrete times t
with t 2 0; 1N T; :::; N 1N T; T	 (cf. Assumption A1 in Hoppe and Lehmann-
Grube, 2005; Simon and Stinchcombe, 1989). In our analysis of the timing
of strategies in the development stage, we will work with continuous time,
which enables us to make use of calculus given we have well-behaved tech-
nological progress functions (i.e. continuous and single-peaked) basically
discrete time with innitely small intervals and continous time are treated
8For models using the speed of technological development as strategic variable, see e.g.
Harris and Vickers (1985a, 1985b), Fershtman and Markovich (2004) and the literature
on patent races in general.
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as equivalent. We then discretize our results to recover the results in dis-
crete time. We assume that T is exogenously given.9 Technological quality
for player i is given by the (time-dependent) function i(t). Quality is con-
tinuously increasing over time and we abstract from R&D costs. Denote
i  i (T ). In the development stage, at each time, players have the fol-
lowing actions available to them: Prelaunch (provided the other player has
not yet undertaken a prelaunch; superscript P ), concede (provided the other
player has undertaken a prelaunch; C ), and stay in (S ). Prelaunching a
technology ends technological progress of the prelaunched technology. By
prelaunching the player commits to a technology with the specications set
out in the prelaunch. Prelaunching is possible at any time between 0 and
T   1, and in keeping with existing literature we rule out the possibility
of coordination failures through simultaneous prelaunch by assuming that
if both players would want to prelaunch at the same time, each has a 50
per cent chance of getting to prelaunch (Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2005,
Dutta, Lach, and Rustichini, 1995, Katz and Shapiro, 1987).10 Conceding
also ends technological progress but involves supporting the rival standard.
This implies having compatible products in the market stage, but also an in-
crease in the marginal cost of production. In other words, conceding implies
a smaller share (because concession implies a cost disadvantage compared
to the standard setter) of a larger pie (because larger network e¤ects imply
higher equilibrium prices and prots). Staying in is straightforward in its
implications since technological progress continues until T .
9An alternative formulation could be a model with decreasing returns to R&D and/or
explicit costs of R&D. T would then be the time when the additional cost of continu-
ing R&D outweigh the added quality improvement. An exogenous deadline is however
commonly used in the literature on timing games.
10However, it would also be feasible to include the possibility of coordination failure in
our model. This would yield di¤erent prelaunch probabilities in game classes 2 and 4 (see
Section 4.2.2), but would not change our general results.
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3.2 Market Stage
The market stage is a quantity-setting duopoly with network e¤ects. We
treat the degree of substitutability as an exogenous parameter. We also
allow for homogeneous (symmetric) as well as heterogeneous (asymmetric)
types of players. The types of the players are given by the quality of their
technology determined in the rst stage, and their costs mi. So asymmetry
can arise from di¤erences in the players technological qualities i at the
development stage and/or di¤erences in their marginal cost. If rms stan-
dardize in the development stage, products are compatible in the product
market, which implies that a user derives network e¤ects from both own-
technology and other-technology users. We model standardization as an
indicator variable  taking value 1 if rms have standardized and 0 oth-
erwise. Firms produce di¤erentiated goods with network e¤ects. Firm 1
faces the following inverse demand function (rm 2s demand function is
constructed analogously):
p1 = 1 +  (q1 + q2)  q1   q2, (1)
where pi and qi are prices and quantities, respectively. Quality (deter-
mined in the rst stage) for the players is denoted by i, own-brand loyalty
by , the degree of substitutability , and the strength of network e¤ects is
denoted by .11 Suppose now that rm 1 has set the standard and rm 2
concedes. Firm 2 su¤ers a loss in competitiveness as it has to adjust to a new
technology. Normalizing marginal cost without concession (i.e. launching
11We assume perfect compatibility so that an additional user of the competing tech-
nology is just as valuable as a user of the own technology. In the case of the CD, this
seems plausible, but extending our model to allow for imperfect compatibility by setting
i >  i in rm is demand function is straightforward and would not add much additional
insights apart from reducing the benets of standardization. We are also assuming two-
way compatibility. Allowing for one-way compatibility would again reduce the incentives
for standardization in the rst stage.
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ones own technology) to zero, we model this loss in competitiveness from
conceding as an increase in the marginal cost of m2 > 0. When convenient,
we will write the di¤erence between technological quality and marginal cost
as bi  i   mi. This is a measure of the value a rm adds for their cus-
tomers (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996, Adner and Zemsky, 2006). For a
rm launching its own technology, bi = i, whereas bi < i for a conceding
rm.
We briey discuss the e¤ects of the model parameters. First, note that
an increase in network e¤ects  is equivalent to increasing own-brand loyalty
(decreasing ). We can write b      as the e¤ective brand loyalty, andb    as the e¤ective degree of substitutability. This illustrates the dual
e¤ect of an increase in the competitors quantity: On the one hand, market
prices decrease (through  q2), but on the other hand, overall network size
grows if products are compatible (through +q2). Product quality i can
di¤er across rms and depends on time t. We model product quality as
increasing the willingness to pay for all consumers, i.e. as an outward shift
of the demand curve. In the rmsoptimization problem, this is equivalent to
di¤ering marginal costs. Finally,  measures the degree of substitutability
between the technologies. We assume that products are di¤erentiated in
terms of brand image, geography, features etc. and that compatibility does
not a¤ect product di¤erentiation.12 An increase in  therefore increases the
overlap between the product markets ( =  implies perfect substitutes13),
while higher i increases market size for a product, and 12 represents the
12Allowing for negative correlation between product di¤erentiation and compatibility
would render standardized markets more competitive and thus less protable. Standard-
ization would be less attractive in such a setting.
13While not explicitly covered by our model, the case  = , 1 = 2 corresponds to
the standard homogenous Cournot model. From there, decreasing the value of  separates
the previously joint markets into only partially overlapping markets. For  = 0 both rms
have local monopolies (see Figure 1).
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ratio of the market sizes, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Increase in substitutability gg = 0
In
cr
ea
se
 in
a
1/a
2
a
1
=
a
2
g = b
a
1
>
a
2
Figure 1: E¤ect of substitutability and quality ratio on market size and
overlap.
We note some parameter restrictions: (i)    >   0; (ii) i(T ) >
mi; i 2 f1; 2g; (iii) ij 

20 ; i; j 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= j. The rst restriction rules
out upward-sloping demand curves (because of a dominant network e¤ect)
and assumes perfect substitutes as limit case.14 The second restriction rules
out the case where adaptation costs are so high that concession is never an
option. The third restriction ensures positive production quantities. We
now discuss the analysis of the game and equilibria in the two stages in the
14One can also allow for every player to have her own value of , and also for asymmetry
in the s: player 1s product may be substitutable for player 2s, but vice versa this may
be not the case, at least not to the same degree. The analysis of this more general model
is beyond the scope of this present paper.
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next section.
4 Analysis
We solve the game by backward induction and analyze the Cournot stage
in section 4.1 and the development stage in 4.2. We show that our gen-
eral game can take on very di¤erent characteristics depending on parameter
values. Specically, our rst stage game can resemble a war-of-attrition,
a preemption game or a last-minute agreement, given certain model para-
meters. Due to the exibility of our model, we can therefore describe and
analyze a broad class of situations with our model. We will rst develop a
procedure to solve the game in general and then illustrate some applications
for particular parameter constellations in Section 5.
4.1 Market stage equilibrium
In the market stage, rms maximize prots given the outcome of the de-
velopment stage. If a prelaunch is followed by a concession, products are
compatible ( = 1). In all other cases no prelaunch or an unsuccessful
prelaunch products are incompatible and  = 0. Prices, quantities and
prots are:
q1 =
2bb1   bb2
4b2   b2 ; p1 = 2
b21b  bbb2
4b2   b2 ; 1 = 0
 
2bb1   bb2
4b2   b2
!2
, (2)
and accordingly for rm 2. It is straightforward to see that for equal
qualities, the conceding rm makes lower prots and has lower market share
than the standard-setting rm since bi < b i. We now present some insights
on how prots change with parameter values. All proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Prots i are increasing in own technological quality i.
No matter whether the outcome of the development stage is a common
standard (compatibility), or not (incompatibility), both playersprots al-
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ways benet from higher quality. As a result, each player generally has an
interest to develop her technology as far as possible. From Lemma 1 and the
prot function in equation (2) it follows directly that a conceding players
prots i decrease in her adaptation costs mi, while prots for a standard-
setting rm j increase in adaptation costs mi. This is intuitive: The higher
the cost of adapting to another rmstechnology, the lower prots and the
less attractive is standardization. Also, player is prots i are decreasing
in the technological quality of its rival j which can be seen by inspection of
the prot functions for incompatibility and compatibility. Note that a one-
unit increase in the rivals quality lowers is prots by less than a one-unit
increase in is own quality since 2 > . Each player therefore generally
prots from competing against a weaker rival. Additionally, if both players
have equal development speed in the development stage this also implies
that is prots decrease by less per period of the rivals development time
than they increase in own development time. Ceteris paribus therefore, this
gives players an incentive to have both players continue until the deadline.
Proposition 1 Player is prots i are decreasing in  if
i
j
< 4
b2+b2
4bb and
increasing for su¢ ciently high  if ij 
4b2+b2
4bb .
This Proposition is illustrated in the following graph (Figure 2), which
shows 1 (assuming incompatibility) for three di¤erent ratios
1
2
and varying
levels of 0    .
We rst note that player 1s prot function has a minimum at min =
2

1b q21b2 22b2
2
. An increase in 12 means that player 1s quality in-
creases relative to player 2s, which implies a lower min. There is an upper
bound for  since   . Depending on the value of 12 , min can be below
or above . If min  , 1 is strictly decreasing in . It is straightforward
to show that with compatibility (incompatibility) this is always given for
1
2
< 54 (1) increasing substitutability between products reduces protabil-
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Profit
Substitutability g
(1) ?1/?2 = 1.5
(2) ?1/?2 = 1.25
(3) ?1/?2 = 1.1
(1) g = 0.764 (2) g = 1 (3) g = 1.283 (> b)
Profit pi
g = 0 g = b = 1
Figure 2: Prot functions for di¤erent quality ratios and degrees of substi-
tutability.
ity. Conversely, if the quality ratio exceeds this threshold, prots may be
increasing in  for su¢ ciently high values of  ( >
2

1b q21b2 22b2
2
),
which at rst appears counterintuitive. This can occur if a player has much
higher quality than the rival. While increased substitutability still increases
competition in the players home market, it also gives increased access to the
weaker rivals market, thereby increasing prots. Conversely, for the weaker
player the negative e¤ects of increased substitutability dominate.
Proposition 2 (i) With incompatibility and type-asymmetry (1 6= 2),
prots of the higher-quality rm increase in the strength of the network e¤ect
, and prots of the lower-quality rm decrease in the strength of the network
e¤ect . (ii) For incompatibility and symmetric types (1 = 2) prots of
15
both players always increase in the strength of the network e¤ect . (iii) With
compatibility (prelaunch and concession), a players prots always increase
in the network e¤ect strength .
We rst explain the type asymmetric case, (a). We have one player
with a larger technological quality ; and one with a smaller quality. Recall
that technological quality  also determines the size of the market for each
player. Assumption (i) implies that the substitutability  > 0. This means
that the markets of both players have at least a small overlap. In this
constellation, the customers who are in the overlap of the markets, have,
with growing (market-specic!) network e¤ects, a stronger incentive to be
part of the bigger market (i.e. network), and hence are lost for the weaker
player. So for the weaker player, the network e¤ect is negative, while the
stronger player gains from it because it enhances the relative attractiveness
of her network. For incompatibility, case (b), the case is simpler: since the
markets do not overlap, both players gain from increasing network e¤ects
within and specic to their own markets. The nal case, (c), is similar:
since both players essentially share the same market, they both gain from
increasing network e¤ects. There is only one joint network, so that both
players always prot to the same extent from an increase in the strength of
the network e¤ect which applies to their joint network.
Having derived prot functions for the two scenarios, we can now go to
the rst stage of the game and identify conditions for a successful prelaunch
in terms of the market parameters in the second stage.
4.2 Development stage equilibrium
Abstracting from timing for the moment, three di¤erent outcomes of the
developing stage seem possible: (i) one of the players undertakes a prelaunch
and the rival does not concede, (ii) one of the players prelaunches and the
rival concedes at some point prior to the conference, (iii) nothing happens
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and both players keep developing until T . If a prelaunch occurs, we are also
interested in who acts as a prelauncher in equilibrium. We now analyze the
conditions under which each outcome emerges in equilibrium and identify
which player prelaunches and/or concedes  if at all. We rst eliminate
some dominated strategies: prelaunching before T after the other player has
prelaunched is dominated by either staying in until T or conceding. This
means that we will only see one prelaunch in the game, and concession will
take place, if at all, at the latest possible time. This gives the following two
results:
Lemma 2 If a player concedes to a prelaunch she always does so at the
latest possible concession time.
Consider a rm that is faced with a prelaunch by its rival some time
before the deadline. The rms decision proceeds in two steps: rst, the
rm has to determine which concession time would maximize concession
prots. This maximum concession payo¤ is then compared to the payo¤s
from staying in. Following Lemma 1, concession payo¤s are maximized at
T . So if concession takes place at all, it will be at the latest possible time 
even if it occurs in response to a much earlier prelaunch.
Lemma 3 With increasing technological quality, only prelaunches that would
trigger concession will be undertaken in equilibrium. Undertaking an unsuc-
cessful prelaunch is dominated by staying in until T .
The intution behind this Lemma is straightforward: prelaunch ends ones
technological progress. This can only be worthwhile doing if there is a gain
in return: concession on the part of the rival and resulting benets (from a
joint network) for both players in case of a successful prelaunch (i.e. one that
triggers concession), and the improved competitive position arising from the
rivals adaptation costs. These gains disappear if the prelaunch is unsuc-
cessful. We can thus reduce the number of possible outcomes from three
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to two, since no unsuccessful prelaunches take place, eliminating possibility
(i). Following Lemma 2, we can also characterize outcome (ii) a prelaunch
followed by concession: even if a prelaunch takes places much earlier, conces-
sion will be at the latest possible time. With these results, we now proceed
to analyze the development stage equilibria.
4.2.1 Timing conditions
To analyze playersequilibrium strategies and the outcomes they yield, we
calculate three times for each player (labeled "timing conditions"): (i) the
rst time CCi when a prelaunch by the rival would trigger concession by
a player (player is concession condition (CCi)), (ii) the rst time PCi
when a player would rather (successfully) prelaunch than simply stay in
(player is prelaunch condition (PCi)), and (iii) the rst time WPCi when
a player would prefer to prelaunch rather than concede in response to a
rivals prelaunch (player is weak prelaunch condition (WPCi)). Overall, no
player i will want to prelaunch before times PCi and 
WPC
i , and no player
will prelaunch before for the opponent js CCj is reached. As soon as all
conditions are fullled, player i would like to prelaunch.
Concession Condition (CC) Suppose the rival has just undertaken a
prelaunch. Following Lemma 3, player i faces the choice between conceding
and staying in. Player is concession condition is dened by the earliest
time t, denoted as CCi , at which player i would concede if there was a
prelaunch at time CCi . In other words, we compare 
C
i (T )  the payo¤
from conceding at T (see Lemma 2) and Si (T ) the prots from staying
in (and not conceding) until T . From Ci (T )  Si (T ) we obtain:
2b (i  mi)  b  j  CCi 
4b   b2  2
bi     j  CCi 
4b2   2 , or
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t  CCi =  1j
0@2b

i (2   ) +

4b2   2mi


4b2    + 2
1A (3)
Prelaunch Condition (PC) Suppose no prelaunch has taken place at
time t, so that player i can either prelaunch or stay in. Analogous to the
CC, player is prelaunch condition is determined by the earliest time t,
denoted as PCi , at which player i would prefer prelaunching to staying in
until T , i.e. Pi
 
PCi
  Si (T ).15 We nd:
2bi  PCi   b (j  mj)
4b2   02  2
bi    (j)
4b2   2 or
t  PCi =  1i
0@b (j  mj)
2b +

4b2   b2
2b 2bi   j4b2   2
1A (4)
Weak Prelaunch Condition (WPC) The WPC captures a players
preference of prelaunching over conceding. For each time t, given that the
rival has not yet undertaken a prelaunch, player 1 faces the hypothetical
choice between prelaunching and conceding to a prelaunch which could hap-
pen at this time t. We dene player is weak prelaunch condition by identi-
fying the earliest time t, denoted as WPCi , at which player i would prefer
prelaunching over conceding (at the latest possible time T ) in response to
a rivals prelaunch at this time t. Comparing Pi
 
WPCi

and Ci (T ), we
obtain (a derivation can be found in the Appendix):
2bi  WPCi   b (j  mj)
4b2   b2  2
b (i  mi)  b  j  WPCi 
4b2   b2 or
15Since the other player has not yet undertaken a prelaunch, concession is not an option.
From Lemma 3 we know that only prelaunches that trigger concession will take place,
so we need only care about the prot function for such prelaunches. Consequently, in
deriving an equilibrium we look simultaneously at the playersprelaunch and concession
conditions, since it may be that PCi < 
CC
j , since both the prelaunch condition for i and
the concession condition for j have to be fullled for i to prelaunch successfully.
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t  WPCi = f (t) 1

20
0
(i  mi) + (j  mj)

, (5)
where f(t) = j
 
WPCi

+
2bb i  WPCi 
Depending on which of these conditions are met, we can identify a num-
ber of di¤erent equilibrium constellations ("game classes").
4.2.2 Game-class dependent equilibria
Having ruled out unsuccessful prelaunches, we classify our equilibria by their
outcomes.16 Either no prelaunch takes place, there is a coordination failure,
or there is a (smooth and successful) prelaunch. To see if all sensible time
orderings

CCi ; 
PC
i ; 
WPC
i ; 
CC
j ; 
PC
j ; 
WPC
j

can be mapped into one of
these outcomes, we rst rule out impossible orderings17 and then consider
all permutations of orderings. We nd that all permutations can be mapped
into "no action" games and prelaunch games with a prelaunch either con-
siderably before the deadline or last-minute. We characterize the prelaunch
games in more detail not all games carry a preemption motive as one might
expect, and we thus highlight the underlying tradeo¤s in a situation with
technological progress, network e¤ect and adaptation costs.
Class 1: "No action" games For none of the players, the conditions nec-
essary for a successful prelaunch (i.e. t  max
h
PCi ; 
CC
j
i
) are ever fullled
prior to the deadline. For "no action" games, the equilibrium strategies are
never to prelaunch and to concede i¤ CCi  t  T . "No action" equilibria
16Prior to analyzing our game classes, we convert our times CCi etc. to discrete time.
Note that therefore two times may coincide in discrete time even if they would in con-
tinuous time. In fact, coincidence of times depends on the number of rounds N and by
increasing N we can always recover the continuous-time case.
17For example, CCi ; 
WPC
i < T and 
PC
i > T is not possible since t > 
CC
i implies
Ci (T ) > 
S
i (T ) and t > 
WPC
i implies 
P
i
 
WPCi

> Ci (T ), from which it follows that
Pi
 
WPCi

> Si (T ) so that 
PC
i < T .
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will emerge if the benets from standardization are relatively low compared
to the cost of conceding, i.e. for low values of  and high values of mi. We
summarize this case in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If no player could successfully prelaunch, both players will
enter a standards battle in the market stage.
Class 2: Preemption games If all three conditions for a successful
prelaunch hold for both players (i.e. max
n
PCi ; 
WPC
i ; 
CC
j
o
;max
n
PCj ; 
WPC
j ; 
CC
i
o

t  T ), players will try and preempt each other: Both players prefer
prelaunching to conceding (since t  PCi ), but they would concede if the
other player did prelaunch before (since t  CCi ).
There are two scenarios we have to consider: (i) if the conditions are
met for one player before they are met for the other, the identity of the
prelauncher is well-dened. Suppose that max
n
PCi ; 
WPC
i ; 
CC
j
o
< t <
max
n
PCj ; 
WPC
j ; 
CC
i
o
. The equilibrium strategy for the player i is to
prelaunch before max
n
PCj ; 
WPC
j ; 
CC
i
o
, but as late as possible following
Lemma 1. If j prelaunches at any t with t > CCi , concede at T . Oth-
erwise, stay in until T . Player js equilibrium strategy is to prelaunch at
max
n
PCj ; 
WPC
j ; 
CC
i
o
if i has not prelaunched. If i has prelaunched at
any t with t > CCj , concede at T . Otherwise, stay in until T . In equilib-
rium therefore, player i will prelaunch just before all conditions are met
for player j. (ii) if max
n
PCi ; 
WPC
i ; 
CC
j
o
= max
n
PCj ; 
WPC
j ; 
CC
i
o
,
both players will want to prelaunch at the same time. We nd a mixed-
strategy equilibrium in which each player prelaunches with probability pti
in each round t. Note that while P;N 1i refers to player is payo¤ from
prelaunching in round N   1, C;N 1i refers to player is payo¤ from con-
ceding in round N in response to a prelaunch by the other player in round
N   1. In the last round in which players could concede, i.e. in N ,
if one player has undertaken a prelaunch in a previous round, the other
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player will concede with probability 1. If no player has prelaunched prior
to this round, both players stay in. In the last round in which players
could prelaunch, i.e. in round N   1, player i prelaunches with probability
pN 1i =
P;N 1j  Sj
1
2
P;N 1j +
1
2
C;N 1j  Sj
and stays in until the next and nal round
with probability 1  pN 1i (where she either concedes if the other player has
prelaunched in round N   1, or stays in otherwise). Player js probabilities
are formed accordingly. In all previous rounds t with 1  t  N   2, player
i prelaunches with probability pti =
P;tj  E(t+1j )
1
2
P;tj +
1
2
C;tj  E(t+1j )
, where E(t+1j ) =
(1 pt+1i )pt+1j P;t+1j +pt+1i (1 pt+1j )C;t+1j +pt+1i pt+1j

P;tj +
C;t
j
2

+E(t+2j )
is the expected payo¤ of player j in round t + 1 given that no player has
undertaken a prelaunch before that. In addition to this mixed strategy equi-
librium, there are also two subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibria,
in which player i always prelaunches at the rst possible time given no prior
prelaunch (CCj ), and concedes at the latest possible time otherwise. The
other player concedes at the latest possible time in response to a prelaunch
at CCj , and prelaunches at the next possible time (
CC
j +1) if no prelaunch
takes place at CCj .
Proposition 4 If both players prefer conceding over a standards battle, but
both prefer prelaunching over conceding, a preemption game follows. If one
player can prelaunch before the other, this player will prelaunch just before
the later prelauncher would.
Class 3: Late prelaunch games If only one players conditions for a
successful prelaunch are met, this player can choose the optimal time to
prelaunch without any threat of being preempted. The conditions for this
scenario to obtain aremax
n
PCi ; 
WPC
i ; 
CC
j
o
 T  max
n
PCj ; 
WPC
j ; 
CC
i
o
.
The pure strategy equilibrium is that player i will prelaunch at the latest
possible prelaunch time, and player j will concede at the latest possible
concession time T . This class can also emerge if
h
PCi ; 
CC
j
i
 T , but no
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other conditions are met before T . In this case, player i would prelaunch
and player j would follow, although player i would prefer to concede herself
(since T < WPCi implies that prots from concession to a prelaunch at T 1
are higher than prots from prelaunching at T  1). Nevertheless, since PCi
states that prelaunching successfully yields higher prots than a standards
battle in the market stage, a prelaunch will take place at the latest possible
time, round N   1, where N is the last round of the game.
Proposition 5 If only one player can successfully prelaunch, a prelaunch
(by this player) will take place at the latest possible time before the deadline.
Class 4: War of attrition games If both players prefer a successful
prelaunch to a standards battle in the market at some point in the game
(i.e.
h
PCi ; 
CC
i ; 
PC
j ; 
CC
j
i
 T ), but both players would prefer conceding
to prelaunching themselves (i.e.
h
WPCi ; 
WPC
j
i
> T ), the game becomes
a war of attrition. Similar to the preemption game (Class 2), both players
will prelaunch with a certain probability (derived in the same way as the
prelaunch probabilities in the preemption game, see the Appendix) starting
from the time when a prelaunch would be successful and preferred over a
standards battle. The main di¤erence to the preemption game is that both
players would rather develop until the end and let the other player prelaunch.
This is likely to occur if the opportunity cost of prelaunching is relatively
high for example if the speed of technological development is high and the
distance between rounds is large and the cost of conceding is comparably
low because the loss in competitiveness (mi) is small. Note that if only
one player would prelaunch (
h
PCi ; 
CC
j
i
 T < PCj ), the prelaunching
player would do so at the latest possible time, but the conceding player
would still make higher prots. In addition to the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium described above, we can also nd two pure-strategy equilibria,
in which player i (or j) always prelaunches at the latest possible time (round
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N 1) and the other player concedes immediately thereafter (round N). We
summarize this class in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If players prefer conceding and developing their technology
as far as possible to prelaunching, a war of attrition will emerge, with a
prelaunch taking place with increasing likelihood as the deadline approaches.
To summarize, our model can generate a range of di¤erent behaviour
and outcomes given the times the respective conditions for prelaunch and
concessions are fullled. In particular, depending on the opportunity cost of
prelaunching in terms of technological progress and the cost of conceding, we
obtain either a preemption game where ine¢ ciencies arise because technolo-
gies are prelaunched at a time when there is still signicant technological
progress to be made, or a war of attrition where both players attempt to
delay their prelaunch, hoping that their rival will prelaunch in the mean-
time.18 If players are signicantly di¤erent in their respective payo¤s, only
one rm may be able to prelaunch successfully, in which case prelaunch and
concession take place at the latest possible time (last-minute standardiza-
tion). Finally, if none of the players would concede following a prelaunch,
a standards battle in the market is inevitable. This typology can be used
to classify specic cases into these regimes and make some inferences about
the respective payo¤s from prelaunching, conceding and waging a standards
battle.
4.2.3 The Development of the Compact Disc
An introduction to the case.19 By the late 1970s, analog audio play-
back technologies had reached their technological limits. Recognizing ana-
logs inherent limitations, nearly all major (and some minor) consumer elec-
tronics manufacturers were committed to research and development in
18This is similar to the penguin e¤ect described by Besen and Farrell (1994).
19For a detailed overview see Gamharter and Kretschmer (2004), or Dai (1996).
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search of a new audio playback technology in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Among the main players were Philips N.V. from the Netherlands, Sony Cor-
poration (Japan), The Victor Company of Japan Ltd. (JVC) and its par-
ent rm Matsushita, as well as Telefunken/Decca (German Teledec). RCA
(USA) and Thompson (France) were also involved in the development of an
enhanced audio format. The players pursued di¤erent technological trajec-
tories: Telefunken worked on a mechanical system ("Mini Disc"). JVCs
system ("Audio High Density") was based on magnetic scanning. Philips
developed an optical disc system based on an early prototype of the (digital)
VideoDisc. Philips announced its rst digital Compact Disc Audio System,
a 110mm optical disc, in May 1978. Sony was also experimenting with a
digital optical system. There was a strong belief in the industry from the
outset that, given the large installed base of the two incumbent formats,
vinyl and cassette tapes, joint e¤orts would be required in order to assert
any new audio playback format. In 1983, 915 in 1000 UK households owned
record and/or tape playback equipment (BPI Yearbook 1992). In particular
therefore, getting the new technology adopted in the crucial popular mu-
sic segment was a major source of concern (McGahan, 1993). In addition,
the experience from recent standards battles on consumer electronics was
still fresh. Sony, for instance, had just lost out with its Betamax technol-
ogy to JVCs VHS system. Against this background, and in recognition of
the complementarity of their particular (technological and market-based)
strengths, Philips and Sony (P/S) nally teamed up in 1979 to jointly de-
velop a technical standard for digital audio playback. They were to remain
competitors in the product market, however. The two rms already had
a history of cooperation, and by teaming up each eliminated a formidable
competitor (McGahan, 1993; Besen and Farrell, 1994). Moreover, both had
a presence in the music industry, whose support for the new technology was
essential: without su¢ cient music available on CD, end consumers would
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never switch to CD. In June 1980, the exact specications were published in
the System Description Compact Disc Digital Audio, the so-called Redbook,
to ensure that all software could be played on all pieces of hardware. The
publication of the Redbook a year before the DAD conference e¤ectively
prelaunched the technology its fundamental properties became xed and
common knowledge, and Philips and Sony started licensing the technology
to other electronics manufacturers, which ensured a broad support base and
compatibility for the technology. By late 1981 P/S had already granted li-
censes to 30 audio equipment manufacturers and 8 record replicators. The
launch of the Redbook was followed by announcements by both Philips and
Sony to present individual prototypes at the 29th Japan Audio Fair in Oc-
tober 1981.20
Approval of the new audio standard took place at the DAD Conference
in April 1981. Announced in 1978 and organized by the Japanese Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) with the explicit aim of
dening a digital audio standard, the conference was attended by 29 con-
sumer electronics manufacturers. At the conference, the technologies by P/S
and JVC were approved, but only P/S ever commercialized their standard.
The conference was e¤ectively preempted by the events between June 1980
(submission and publication of the Redbook) and January 1981 when Mat-
sushita, the parent company of JVC, announced its intention to support the
P/S technology. Matushitas decision marked the real turning point since
now the CD was supported by the three largest consumer electronic rms
(Dai, 1996). When it came to commercialization, there was a strong im-
petus among competing CD manufacturers to promote not only their own
brand but the CD in general to establish it as the new industry standard.
Despite initial scarcity in software, adoption by nal consumers was fast and
widespread. Increased sound quality and user-friendliness won over the pop-
20Press release Nr. 8403E, October 1980, by Philips Press O¢ ce.
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ular segment in particular much faster than expected (McGahan, 1993).21
In the following section, we will relate the outcomes of the case to a set of
parameter values in our model that are consistent with it.
Connecting model and empirical data Our model gives some insight
into the motives of the players in the CD game. First, we note that the
outcome of the CD development stage was that P/S prelaunched their tech-
nology well ahead of the DAD conference and JVC/Masushita conceded
briey prior to the conference. We further know only two of the solutions
presented at the DAD conference (P/S and JVC/Matsushita) were actually
approved, which suggests that only these two technologies passed a certain
minimum quality threshold set by conference participants. As regards the
relationship of their qualities, we argue that JVC/Matsushitas solution was
not vastly superior (and probably inferior) to the Redbook standard. If
JVC/Matsushitas solution had indeed been superior, the di¤erence in qual-
ities can not have been large enough to o¤set the advantage from a common
standard and the competitive disadvantage through adaptation costs (in-
cluding licensing fees paid to P/S). From the outcome we infer that the CD
launch was either a preemption game or a war of attrition. Both players, the
P/S alliance and JVC/Masushita, started their focused development e¤ort
towards the new audio playback technology roughly at the same time, at
some point during the mid- to late-1970s. To be more precise, we consider
1978, when the conference was scheduled for 1981, as the starting point
of these e¤orts and, hence, of our development stage. Given that at this
time, none of the technological trajectories pursued was clearly superior, it
seems plausible that they started out at similar initial levels. Based on these
two propositions, we infer that the speed of technological progress probably
21Prior to its introduction in 1982, Philips/Sony had been hoping that somewhat more
than 10m CDs would be sold worldwide in 1985. Within a year, they revised their forecasts
to 15m CDs. Actual sales of CDs in 1985 were 59m.
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di¤ered between the two players and that P/S was the "stronger" player
experiencing faster technological progress. In that case, it seems rather un-
likely that the CD case falls into either the symmetric preemption game
class or the symmetric war-of-attrition. As a result, we suggest that the CD
case is best described by our "asymmetric" preemption game class and the
corresponding equilibrium: While it is clear that there will be a successful
prelaunch, and it will be the stronger player who undertakes it, the threat
of the weaker player undertaking a successful prelaunch forces the stronger
player to launch her technology prior to the preferred prelaunch time, just
before the conference. Instead, the prelaunch will take place just before the
rst time the weaker player could successfully undertake a prelaunch.
An example with linear technological progress We now use a specic
technological progress function and x parameter values to illustrate some
of our outcomes. Using the expressions we derived for PCi , 
WPC
i and 
CC
i ,
we analyze playerstiming decisions. While we are relatively condent that
standard-setting in the context of the CD was an asymmetric preemption
game by knowing the nal outcome and the identity of the prelauncher,
we cannot ultimately identify whether the (prelaunching) P/S alliance or
(the conceding) JVC/Matsushita was the stronger player with respect to
the quality of their technology as we will show with a numerical example.
We choose both players technological progress functions i(t) to be lin-
ear in time and to have the same initial value: i(t) = ait + x. Denote
JVC/Matsushita as rm 1 and P/S as rm 2. Further, we use the values
 = 1 for substitutability,  = 32 for own brand loyalty,  =
1
2 for the
strength of network e¤ects and m1 = m2 = 14 for adaptation costs. These
values satisfy our assumptions (i)   (iii). We can then calculate the times
PCi ; 
WPC
i ; 
CC
i and subsequently convert them to discrete times to derive
equilibrium behaviour. We nd the following expressions in terms of ai; aj
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and x (common to both players):
CCi =
2+2ai x
3aj
PCi =
5ai  32aj  12x  14
4ai
WPCi = 1  516ai+4aj
We now specify values for the initial technological quality x = 2 and
their rate of increase, a1 = 32 , a2 = 2 This means that both players initially
had the same level of know-how, but P/S was developing faster. We model
the process using 1000 rounds (corresponding to t = 0 to t = 1 in continuous
time) and obtain the values in panel 2a).
Panel 2a) Panel 2b) Panel 2c) Panel 2d)
Player 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
CCi 500 889 600 741 400 1111 667 1111
PCi 542 812 625 725 417 900 625 875
WPCi 844 868 837 847 853 891 844 868
x 2 2 2 1
a1
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
a2
4
2
5
3
5
2
4
2
We give an interpretation of Panel 2a). For player 2, prelaunch is an
option as soon as t  maxPC2 ; WPC2 ; CC1 	. This is the case from round
868. Conversely for player 1, this is given from round 889 onwards. Player 2
would then prelaunch starting from round 868, but, following Lemma 1, will
wait until round 888 to maximize technological progress under the constraint
of having to preempt player 1s prelaunch in round 889. Interestingly, player
2 is limited by its own willingness to concede in round 889 the later player
2s CC is met, the more technological progress can be achieved. In Panel
2b), we bring the technological strength of the two players closer together.
This changes the outcome of the game since now player 1 will prelaunch in
round 846, just before player 2 would prelaunch. Interestingly, the binding
constraint here is whether a player prefers prelaunching over conceding. The
stronger player (2) has more to gain from delaying adoption and further
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improving its technology so that conceding (and getting the full network
e¤ects) is preferred over curtailing technological development. In Panel 2c),
we assume a greater technological di¤erence between the players. In this
case, player 2 would never concede in the relevant time horizon (since CC2 >
T ), so that the only possible prelauncher is player 2, who will prelaunch at
the latest possible time, round 999. A similar situation arises if the overall
level of technological quality decreases (x = 2  ! 1) in Panel 2d). In this
case, player 2 would never concede, and would prelaunch in round 999.
These numerical examples illustrate a number of interesting points: rst,
the stronger player does not always prelaunch, as we can see from Panel 2b).
Although prots from prelaunching are higher for the stronger player, the
benets from conceding later on may be higher still. Secondly, if techno-
logical quality is su¢ ciently low at the end of the game T (Panel 2d)) or
the di¤erence between the two technologies su¢ ciently high (Panel 2c)), the
stronger player may never be willing to concede, which ensures that the
stronger player gets to prelaunch without the threat of preemption. Con-
versely, if the stronger player would concede to a prelaunch relatively early,
this limits the degree to which he can delay prelaunching  the preemp-
tion threat by the other player gets stronger the smaller the di¤erence in
qualities, and in the limit we obtain the rent equalization result from Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1985), where preemption motives between two symmetric
players trigger a prelaunch at the earliest feasible time.
5 Discussion
Our results and the information on the case suggest that the development of
the CD was an asymmetric preemption game where the stronger player
got to prelaunch successfully. The threat of preemption by a su¢ ciently
strong rival would have created an ine¢ ciency in terms of foregone techno-
logical progress. Applying our model to the motivating case suggests that
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P/S design was indeed the more e¢ cient technology and that JVC con-
ceded because it was not worth introducing an incompatible design into the
market, but that there was some concern that P/S might be preempted by
a JVC/Matsushita-led alliance.
Two further details are noteworthy: Since higher adaptation costs make
it less attractive to concede and thereby reduce the likelihood of agreeing
on a common standard, we interpret the fact that the P/S alliance not only
launched a prototype but added extensive documentation in the Redbook
as having had the positive (side) e¤ect of reducing adaptation costs for
potential conceders, chiey JVC/Matsushita. Top management in the
P/S alliance explicitly encouraged their R&D divisions to keep the technol-
ogy as simple as possible given a minimum quality threshold (Gamharter
and Kretschmer, 2004). A second interesting issue concerns the time hori-
zon T . An increase (decrease) in the relevant time horizon T implies that
both players conditions (CC; SPC; WPC) are satised later (earlier). This
implies that getting the timing of the deadline (in the CD case, the DAD
conference) "right" might contribute a good deal to the success of the stan-
dardization process. Too early a time might sacrice quality for speed and
thereby endanger the new standardsacceptance by the end consumer. Too
late a time might delay the agreement on a joint solution and prolong the
phase of uncertainty, encouraging leapfrogging behavior by nal consumers
(Shy, 1996).
It is interesting to link the results of our study to a network relations
perspective (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and Tsai, 2004). Our model illus-
trates the competitive dynamics of alliances by highlighting the importance
of immediate competitive e¤ects as well as more indirect e¤ects in adjacent
markets such as complementary goods producers, e.g. record manufactur-
ers. Their initial resistance towards the new audio playback technology
made it even more attractive to set a standard early on, as a standards
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battle with the consequent splintering of software providers would have low-
ered the attractiveness of any new digital audio technology. Also, the two
basic options (pre-market standardization and standards battle) analyzed
in our model are comparable to the alternatives discussed in a co-opetition
perspective on alliance network evolution (Gimeno, 2004), namely (1) con-
necting to a rivals network of alliances, and (2) developing countervailing
alliances. In the case of the CD, the actors chose the rst option, whereas
the current battle between Blu-ray and HD-DVD is an example of the sec-
ond (BusinessWeek, 2005/10/6). Two competing networks (one featuring
Toshiba, NEC, Intel and IBM, the other including Sony, Philips, Panasonic
and Pioneer) emerged, each containing rms at various stages of the value
chain. The networks then engaged in a standards battle in the nal con-
sumer market. This situation, apart from generating incompatibility losses,
creates scope for third parties outside the two alliance blocks, such as Sam-
sung, to step into the standardization gap by o¤ering hardware compatible
with both networks (Smith, 2005).
6 Conclusion
To summarize, we believe that our simple model illustrates a number of inter-
esting phenomena, especially the tradeo¤ between preemption motives and
technological development and the likely outcomes in terms of preemptive
standardization, last-minute agreements, and all-out standards battles in
the marketplace. The strategies specied in our model capture a wide range
of activities in the development stage of a new technology. Prelaunching
a technology covers a wide variety of actions where a technologys sponsor
commits to a certain product specication for example, exhibiting a pro-
totype at a fair, publishing a set of specications (as in the case of the CD),
or preannouncing technical features are all versions of the prelaunch strat-
egy in our model. Likewise, concession by rival technologies could be the
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public endorsement of the prelaunched technology, negotiations to ensure
compatibility or even redirecting research e¤orts to conform to the industry
standard. Overall, from the interplay of the playerrelative strengths, the
strength of network e¤ects, the degree of substitutability and each prod-
ucts own brand loyalty, a wide range of outcomes emerges, depending on
the particular parameter values. We group the outcomes into four distinct
and fundamentally di¤erent classes, for instance preemption games and war-
of-attrition games. In addition, we show how slight variations in parameter
values can shift a game into a di¤erent class, for instance from one where
the stronger player prelaunches without threat of preemption, to one where
she gets hurried along into a "prematurely" early prelaunch.
We note several limitations to our model. First, we restrict our analy-
sis to two direct rivals. It would be interesting to consider the inuence
of additional players, either direct rivals or complementors such as software
suppliers or hardware manufacturers without own R&D. In fact, recent re-
search on interrm networks emphasizes the importance of triadic structures
and highlights possible di¤erences between triadic and dyadic structures in
terms of formation patterns (Madhavan, Gnyawali and He, 2004). Second,
our choice to ignore development costs and to set an exogeneous end point
of the game was made for analytical convenience, although this enabled us
to focus on explaining the outcome of our motivating case. A formulation
including development costs and no exogenous deadline could help uncover
some interesting dynamics, although the general tradeo¤ of precommitment
versus further technological development would remain the same. Third,
technological progress is deterministic in our model. A specication with
stochastic technological improvement might generate interesting results on
speculative and/or unsuccessful prelaunches. Finally, assuming that players
know each others type restricts the applicability of our model. An analysis
of this setup but with incomplete information would be interesting, and is
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the subject of ongoing work.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We express player 1s prot function for compati-
bility as well as incompatibility in the most general form (1(b1)) and nd
that it is increasing in b1. For 1(b1) = b2bb1 bb2
4b2 b2
2
, we have the rst
derivative with respect to b1 as @1(b1)@b1 = 4b2(4b2 b2)2 2bb1   bb2  0 since
2bb1   bb2  0 by assumption (iii) and 4b2
(4b2 b2)2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: Based on the equilibrium prot functions for
the market stage we take the rst derivative of player 1s prot function 1
with respect to  and b, respectively. That is,
@1(b)
@b = 2
b(2bb1   bb2)4b2   b22b 2bb1   bb2  b2 4b2   b2
4b2   b24
This is negative for b1b2 < 4b
2
+b2
4bb , positive b1b2 > 4b
2
+b2
4bb , and constant with
respect to b for b1b2 = 4b2+b24bb . By the chain rule, the same holds if we take
the derivative with respect to .
Proof of Proposition 2: Based on the equilibrium prot functions for
the market stage we distinguish between the cases of incompatibility and
compatibility. The rst derivative of player 1 s prot function 1 with
respect to the network e¤ect  is given by:
(a) for incompatibility and type-asymmetry:
@Incomp1 ()
@
=
 812b 4b2   2+ 222(12b2 + 2) + 421b2(4b2 + 32)
4b2   23
This is positive if the following conditions hold (i)  < 2b, and (ii) 3+12b2
62b+8b3 <
i
j
(where ij <
2b
 and also
j
i
< 2
b
 , according to model assumption (iii)).
We now look for the maximum of 
3+12b2
62b+8b3 . Its identication allows for nd-
ing an absolute threshold for the ratio 12 beyond which the condition always
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holds, irrespective of the values of any other parameters than the players
qualities (within the boundaries of our model assumptions). From (i), we
have 12 <
b
 . From (ii), we have
1
2
>
1+12(
b

)2
6
b

+8(
b

)3
which is strictly decreasing
in (
b
 ). If a function is strictly decreasing, then it has its maximum at the
smallest (allowed) parameter value. Therefore, we know that the inequality
will hold for any values of b and  if it holds for the smallest allowed ratio
of
b
 (because this is where the maximum of the function
b
 lies), which is
1
2 .
Plugging
b
 =
1
2 into the inequality resulting from (ii) yields 1 as threshold.
That means if 12 > 1, then (the stronger) player 1s prots 1 are always
increasing in , while (the weaker) player 2s prots 2 are decreasing in 
because the reciprocal value does not satisfy the condition 21 > 1.
(b) for incompatibility and type-symmetry, the rst derivative of each
players prot function i with respect to the network e¤ect  is positive.
(c) for compatibility where the conceding player is player 1 with b1 =
1  m1:
@Comp1 ()
@
=
=
(2b1(   )  2(   ))(2b1(   )(42 + 32   2 + 32   4( + ))
(4(   )2   (   )2)3 +
+
2(8
3 + 33   112 + 2   3   122( + ) + 2(2 + 10 + 2)))
(4(   )2   (   )2)3
This is positive given the above general assumptions of the model are satis-
ed and additionally j > 0. And analoguously, for compatibility where
the prelaunching player 1 has m1 = 0 and the conceding player 2 hasb2 = 2  m2 we have the same reasoning only that m2 > m1.
Proof of Lemma 2: Player is concession prots Ci are given by 
C
i (t) =b2bbi(t) bj()
4b2 b2
2
, where  is the time at which the other players prelaunch
took place. The derivative with respect to time t is given by ddt

i (t) =
4b22b0i(t) 0j()
4b2 02

d
dtbi(t);which is positive, since we have ddtbi(t) > 0
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(see assumption (i) above) and t >  and the production quantity con-
straint bibj  2b :At any given time t it is therefore benecial for the conceder
to wait a bit longer.
Proof of Lemma 3: If rm 1 undertakes a prelaunch at t before the
deadline T which does not trigger concession by the other player 2 then we
derive for a payo¤ comparison with the minimum payo¤ that player 1 can
guarantee herself by staying in until T : 1;t  1;T ) 2b1;t   2;T 
2b1;T   2;T ) 1;Punt = b (2b1;t 2;T )2
(2b )2(2b+)2

b(2b1;T 2;T )2
(2b )2(2b+)2

=
1;S
Derivation of Weak Prelaunch Condition (WPC) Argued from player
1s perspective: This is the case i¤ 2b1(t)   bb2(T ) > 2bb1(T )   b2(t)
and this is the case i¤ 1(T )   1(t) < b
2b (2(t)   2(T ) +m) +m. The
left hand side of this inequality is greater than zero but tends to zero as
t ! T . The right hand side of the equation is not necessarily greater
than zero, but increases in t and approaches m(1 + b
2b ). For nonzero
m, this is greater than zero and hence the left hand side must at some t
(smaller than T ) be smaller which proves the claim. We can also determine
the time at which this is the case, by solving for t-dependent quantities:
2bb (1(T ) m) m+ 2(T ) < 2(t) + 2bb 1(t) so that the condition is ful-
lled from tP>C;1 = tmin = f
 1(2
bb (1(T ) m) m+2(T )) onwards, where
f 1 is the inverse function of f(t) = 2(t) + 2
bb 1(t) . (Note: this does not
necessarily imply that the players concession condition and/or prelaunch
condition hold.)
Proof of Proposition 3: By denition, prelaunch payo¤s are always dom-
inated by stay in for both players, and so both players would fare worse if
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they would deviate from the "always stay in" strategy. Hence the players
strategies are equilibrium strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4: Similarly to class one, the strategy is, by con-
struction, an equilibrium strategy. For the symmetric case, we have to show
that the probabilities stated in the text actually lead to an equilibrium. The
probability for player i to prelaunch is pi. The expected payo¤E1 for player
one in round N   1 is. EN 11 = p1p2

N 1c;1 +
N 1
P;1
2

+(1  p1)p2N 1c;1 +(1 
p2)p1
N 1
p;1 + (1   p1)(1   p2)s;1. We nd an equilibrium if no player can
improve his expected payo¤ by changing his prelaunch probability p:This is
the case if dE1dp1 = p2

N 1c;1 +
N 1
P;1
2

  p21c + (1   p2)1p   (1   p2)1s = 0.
Solving for p2 produces the formula for round round N   1 as given in the
text.For any preceding round there is a slight di¤erence: for the case that
none of the players prelaunch we cannot assume that the payo¤ will be s.
Instead, we have to insert the expected payo¤ for the remaining rounds.
Hence the playersstrategies are equilibrium strategies.
Proof of Proposition 5: By construction, prelaunching is always dom-
inated by player j, by both concession and stay in. Hence player j would
fare worse if he deviated from the strategy. For player i, prelaunch before all
three conditions are satised, is by denition dominated by not prelaunch-
ing. Prelaunching before the last possible moment is always dominated by
prelaunching in the last possible moment (Lemma 1). Hence the players
strategies are equilibrium strategies.
Proof of Proposition 6: See class 2 analoguously. For the mixed-strategy
equilibrium, while the derivation of probabilities is analogous to class 2, the
di¤erent outcomes result from the di¤erences in payo¤s from conceding or
prelaunching.
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Proof of Proposition 7: By construction, player j would fare worse if
s/he was to prelaunch at any time. Player i would fare better if s/he could
concede, but since player j would fare worse if s/he was to prelaunch, player i
does not expect this to happen. Stay in, however, is dominated by prelaunch,
so player i will prelaunch. According to Lemma 1, this will happen at the
latest possible time. Hence the playersstrategies are equilibrium strategies.
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